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This paper presents a three-dimensional conceptualization of conflict of interest (COI) 
regulation directed towards assuring the impartial and unbiased decision-making of 
parliamentarians. We distinguish and separately measure (based on a new dataset) COI 
Strictness, Sanctions and Transparency and show they indeed constitute empirically 
separate dimensions of parliamentary ethics regimes adopted in European democracies. To 
illustrate the usefulness of our indices, we examine the relationship between them and trust 
in national parliaments across 25 democracies. Unlike our Sanction and Transparency 
Index, the COI Strictness Index (composed of strictness of rules and enforcement) has a 
significant and robust negative association with trust, which highlights the importance of 
disentangling different elements of COI regimes. While future research has to explore the 
causal relationships between COI regulation and trust, capturing the complexity of COI 
regimes in an unbiased fashion and thereby making them comparable across European 
democracies is an essential step towards doing so.  
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The Importance of Parliamentary Ethics Regulation  
Institutional accountability mechanisms in representative democracies ought to ensure that 
central democratic agents such as elected representatives act in line with citizens’ interests. 
They are essential to sustain democratic legitimacy (Olsen 2013). Yet to analyse their 
consequences requires us to conceptualize and measure them (Bovens 2010: 960-1). This 
paper does so with a focus on a group of accountability mechanisms whose usage has 
expanded considerably over the last years: the regulation of conflict of interest (COI) which 
encompasses the range of formal-legal requirements or restrictions1 to assure publicly 
elected officials’ impartial or unbiased decision-making (Allen 2008a: 307-8; Nikolov 2013: 
407; Demmke and Henökl 2007). More concretely, we ask how conflicts of interest that 
national parliamentarians might encounter are regulated in European democracies. How can 
we systematically capture differences in COI regulation suitable for large-scale cross-
national analysis to assess how they matter?  
 
To assess the nature of ethics regimes regulating parliamentarians in his or her activities as 
public representative2 is important as self-regulation – traditionally the norm in the field of 
parliamentary ethics – is increasingly considered insufficient. Both the autonomy of 
parliamentarians as individual office-holders as well as of parliaments as collective 
institutions to generate their own solutions to conflict of interest problems has generally 
decreased over the last decades, often in response to scandals or other crises (Atkinson and 
Mancuso 1991: 475; Williams 2006; Allen 2008a). The enhanced saliency of parliamentary 
ethics as regulatory ‘target area’ has become visible through new forms of transparency 
requirements, registers or the establishment of new ‘ethics bureaucracies’ that enforce such 
regulations. These developments not only highlight a growing complexity of 
parliamentarians’ regulatory environments as such. They point to a particular suspicion 
                                                          
1
 Our analysis excludes voluntary rules which are not formally enforceable (Sieberer et al 2016: 63).  
2
 This is distinct from anti-corruption or anti-bribery legislation regulating MPs as self-interested individuals 
who try to gain financial benefits. Giving in to conflicts of interest in legislative decision-making is associated 
with bias but does not necessarily generate private financial gain. 
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towards elected office-holders who (at least partly) regulate themselves, including sensitive 
areas such as the setting of their MP salaries or defining the rules of access to and usage of 
expenses, parliamentary grants or funding for political parties (e.g. Demmke and Henökl 
2007: 35; Clark 2015: 2; see also Biezen and Kopecký 2008; Allen 2011; Casal Bértoa et al 
2014; Allen and Birch 2015).  
 
COI regulation fundamentally refers to MPs’ exercise of their representative function as it 
aims at either preventing or disclosing those situations in which parliamentarians’ impartial 
and objective exercise of professional duties might be compromised (Messick 2014: 114-
115; Nikolov 2013: 412). Consequently, unlike earlier cross-national studies focused on the 
regulation of financial asset disclosure (e.g. Djankov et al 2010; Krambia-Kapardis 2013; van 
Aaken and Voigt 2011), we propose a more encompassing concept as suggested in 
comparative law covering ‘preventing mechanisms’ (e.g. bans) and ‘disclosure mechanisms’ 
(e.g. transparency requirements) (Rose-Ackerman 2014: 14; Mattarella 2014: 33-4), 
capturing the full range of constraints imposed on parliamentarians. More specifically, this 
paper conceptualizes a continuum of constraints as foundation for measuring different 
components of ‘COI regulatory regimes’ (Allen 2008b: 56-7): the strictness of the rules 
adopted, the presence and strength of enforcement structures, sanctions against rule 
violations and transparency requirements. While doing justice to the growing empirical 
diversity of COI structures (e.g. Demmke et al 2007), considering disclosing and preventive 
mechanisms as alternative means to counter unethical behaviour in legislative processes 
overcomes the methodological problem of functional equivalence, a challenge in 
comparative politics research more broadly (van Deth 1998). It recognizes that making 
positions or behaviour incompatible with public roles pre-empts the need for disclosure. 
Studying disclosure regulation in isolation risks categorizing ‘most different’ regulatory 
environments jointly as ‘weakly regulated’ or ‘permissive’, overlooking that disclosure 
regulation might be weak because democracies have adopted little COI regulation or 
because they heavily rely on bans instead.  
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The study of COI regulation is of broader theoretical and empirical significance as it 
intersects with several on-going debates cross-cutting public policy, comparative politics and 
political theory. Conceptualizing and measuring multiple dimensions of COI regulation links 
important theoretical work on different public accountability mechanisms with empirical 
research on the changing nature and growing complexity of parliamentary ethics regulation 
(Demmke et al 2007; Bovens 2010; Olsen 2013). Importantly, it addresses calls for the 
development of conceptually sound, wide-ranging, comparative, and well-constructed 
indices of central mechanisms directed towards ensuring the ‘political integrity’ of public 
office-holders (Rose and Heywood 2013: 157; Rose-Ackerman 2014). We deliver such 
indices by systematically integrating – both conceptually and empirically - elements of COI 
regulation usually studied in isolation (Djankov et al. 2010, Krambia-Kapardis 2013, Nikolov 
2013; van Aaken and Voigt 2011), which has been highlighted as problematic by theoretical 
works, asking for the study of combinations of distinct measures (e.g. sanctions, the nature 
of enforcement structures) central to a more nuanced understanding of how accountability 
arrangements operate (Olsen 2013: 450). Furthermore, our analysis contributes to 
discussions about the consequences of adopting distinct types of mechanisms, such as 
transparency measures’ implications for citizens’ trust (O'Neill 2002), how distinct 
accountability mechanisms compare to each other in this respect (Bovens et al 2014), and  
about the consequences of regulation generally (economic or political) on citizens’ attitudes 
and beliefs (Aghion et al. 2010).  
 
In the following, we conceptualize and then measure COI regulation drawing on a new 
dataset covering 26 European democracies. We show that – in line with our 
conceptualizations - COI regimes vary along three empirical dimensions and discuss the 
cross-national patterns found. Then, we illustrate the usefulness of distinguishing different 
dimensions of COI regimes by examining how our indices associate with trust in national 
parliaments. Different from COI Sanctions and COI Transparency, our COI Strictness Index 
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shows a significant and robust negative association with individual level trust in national 
parliaments. This stresses the importance of disentangling different elements of COI 
regulation when trying to explore how such regulation relates to other variables, be they 
attitudinal or behavioural. We conclude with a discussion how the concept and measures 
presented can be made useful in other areas of comparative research. 
 
Conceptualizing Conflict of Interest Regulation 
COI regulation understood as ethics regulation directed against representative bias 
encompasses legal mechanisms directed towards either preventing situations (e.g. through 
bans and incompatibility rules) or disclosing situations (e.g. through transparency 
requirements) where public officials’ impartial and objective exercise of professional duties 
might be compromised (Messick 2014: 114-115). This distinction between bans/limits and 
disclosure mechanisms is useful analytically since it allows us to systematically map out 
configurations of mechanisms according to the constraints they impose on the office-holders 
concerned across the core substantive areas of COI regulation (e.g. the receipt of gifts or the 
holding of ancillary posts). Disclosing constraints are less intrusive than preventive 
mechanisms, since MPs are not prevented from engaging in any behaviour. Distinguishing 
these mechanisms allows us to consider the compensatory nature between them, namely 
that preventive mechanisms that restrict politicians in what they can legally do (e.g. through 
incompatibilities rules or bans) decrease the need for disclosure requirements in the area 
concerned, essential to arrive at unbiased cross-national measures of COI regulation.  
 
Three Elements of COI Regimes: COI Strictness, Sanctions, Transparency 
When distinguishing preventive from disclosing COI mechanisms we refer to the 
constraining nature of COI rules. However, the type of rules adopted is only one aspect of 
the ‘COI regime’ overall, which encompasses also the infrastructure or instruments created 
or available for rule implementation (Allen 2008b: 56-7). We therefore distinguish three basic 
elements of the COI regime reflecting distinct ways of constraining the behaviour of the 
6 
 
 
 
office-holder they apply to: ‘COI Strictness’ captures aspects in the regime that increase the 
likelihood that formal COI violations are officially detected and notified (the strictness of rules 
and the nature of enforcement); ‘COI Sanctions’ captures the costs imposed on 
parliamentarians when COI violations are detected and ‘COI Transparency’ captures the 
conditions for third party control. Figure 1 displays the analytical relationships of these three 
elements to the basic concept of ‘COI regime’ and to the analytical distinction between 
preventive and disclosing mechanisms used to characterize the constraints inherent in each 
of the elements. 
 
Figure 1: Core Elements Underpinning COI Regimes 
 
 
 
 
 
Among the three elements, COI Strictness is theoretically most central. The presence and 
strictness of rules determines the overall scope of incentives directly structuring the behavior 
of MPs as representatives and law-makers. Strictness logically constitutes a necessary 
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condition for both transparency measures and sanctions. Information about parliamentarians 
can only be made public, if it had to be officially reported in the first place. Only if we find 
COI rules, sanctions can be in place to punish their violation. Finally, rule specificity and the 
strength of enforcement affect how meaningful and effective both sanctions and 
transparency measures can be. Rules define which information ought to be made 
transparent, while separate enforcement structures create an important foundation for 
sanction mechanisms can be applied. 
Moving to the specification of each element and starting with COI strictness, from the 
perspective of parliamentarians, the presence and (if adopted) nature of COI rules can be 
conceptualized as constraints that make it more likely that officially recognized rule violations 
are detected. By definition, if conflicts of interest remain unregulated, parliamentarians 
cannot violate any rules. Vice versa, the higher the number of areas in which COI rules are 
adopted (e.g. regulation of gifts, accessory posts, assets), the stricter and more clear-cut 
and less ambiguous these rules are (e.g. through the complete ban of certain behaviours), 
the more likely rule violations become. If, in addition, any observable violations are 
investigated and confirmed by an actor formally in charge of doing so (Allen 2011: 213; 
Rosenthal 2005: 158; see also Gay 2006), the officially recognised violation of COI 
regulation as a form of misconduct is most likely. Consequently, conceptually, we need to 
consider rule strictness and enforcement in conjunction with each other.  
 
A strong enforcement structure for the implementation of regulation is usually associated 
with the capacity to sanction rule violations (e.g. Nassmacher 2003; O’Halloran 2011; 
Mattarella 2014). Yet there are two reasons to treat the ‘range of sanctions underpinning 
COI rules’ as a separate element of the COI regime. First, conceptually speaking, COI 
strictness and COI sanctions impose different types of constraints on the public office-
holders whose behaviour they aim at influencing. While strict rules combined with strong 
enforcement structures make it less likely that parliamentarians can hope for violations not to 
8 
 
 
 
be officially detected, sanctions shape the relative costs of rule violations once they are 
detected. Second, empirically speaking, the assumed link between COI sanctions and 
enforcement structures is only partial: not all sanctions attached to violations of COI 
regulations are attached to or controlled by enforcement structures established for dealing 
with COI issue. In fact, we might have a COI regime that does not contain any enforcement 
structures in charge of COI regulation. Still, a considerable range of COI violations could be 
answered by criminal sanctions controlled by courts. Focusing on sanctions as controlled by 
enforcement structures in charge of COI monitoring (rather than on the full range of 
sanctions underpinning COI rules) would lead to misleading comparative evaluations of COI 
regimes’ properties. 
 
Public transparency requirements (rather than mere intra-institutional disclosure) assuring 
easy public access to a wide range of information about parliamentarians (usually via online 
release) can provide the basis for ‘third party control’ by the media, interested organizations 
or individual citizens (Djankov et al 2010). They are sometimes considered as a possible 
substitute for a strong institutional enforcement structure or as a complement to the latter 
(Nassmacher 2003: 10-12). However, for conceptual reasons, we treat transparency 
measures separate from COI strictness (of which enforcement forms part). The mere release 
of information on MPs’ activities to the public might allow for third party control but does not 
necessarily contribute to the capacity of the COI regime to detect officially recognized non-
compliance with COI rules, the theoretical underpinning of COI strictness.  Problematic 
practices might be occasionally picked up by the media and thereby generate reputational 
costs for the individual MP concerned (Krambia-Karpadis 2013: 46). However, accountability 
deficits can occur if the actors who are institutionally in charge to call others to accounts 
which might lack motivation, time and energy, knowledge or capabilities, a challenge 
particularly pronounced in the case of transparency measures where citizens play this role 
(Olsen 2013: 545; 556). Furthermore, ‘control activity’ of third parties or the media is bound 
to be much more time contingent (depending on the saliency of the issue area regulated), 
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and thus not equivalent to the on-going monitoring of rule compliance by a public body in 
charge of detecting formal misconduct (Allen 2011: 213). 
 
Constructing Indices of COI Regulation 
To examine whether our three-dimensional conceptualization of COI regimes matches 
regulatory patterns across European democracies (i.e. whether they can indeed be 
systematized along three empirical dimensions) we compiled a new dataset. We coded COI 
regulation (covering both preventing and disclosing mechanisms) based on the evaluation 
reports from the 4thGreco round on “Corruption prevention in respect of members of 
Parliament, judges and prosecutors”, which provided the most encompassing and 
standardized information on COI regimes adopted in a wide range of EU democracies (see 
Online Appendix A for details on alternative sources and the coding process). Among those 
democracies evaluated by Greco3, we restricted our sample to fully consolidated European 
countries to assure basic unit homogeneity in terms of democratization, the centrality of 
parliamentary institutions, rule of law and of the basic administrative capacity to implement 
the studied regulation. This left us with a sample of 26 countries. 
 
Three Elements of COI Regimes – Three Empirical Dimensions?  
In a first step, we constructed four basic components that we expect to underpin three 
dimensions COI strictness (composed of rule strictness and enforcement), COI sanctions 
and COI transparency. For each, we made use of rankings and a linear aggregation method. 
This choice is important as we are interested in capturing the constraints inherent in the COI 
regime across several dimensions with various predictors on an ordinal scale. As most 
composite indicators (OECD 2008: 31) all our indices are constructed on the basis of equal 
weights, in line with our analytical set-up  emphasizing equal importance of COI indicators 
                                                          
3
 Greco is the “Group of States Against Corruption”, an international organisation that was established in 1999 
by the Council of Europe to monitor States’ compliance with the organisation’s anti-corruption standards. 
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capturing different constraints inherent in COI regimes (see Figure 1 above). The final 
scores for each index are standardized from zero to one. 
 
To operationalize our analytical framework, we assess rule strictness by capturing the type 
of legal mechanism employed and rank the respective regulatory configurations according to 
the constraints they imply across 11 core areas of COI regulation. In line with earlier studies, 
those areas are: public and private accessory activities, assets, contracts with state 
authorities, employment offers (or cooling off regulations), income, liabilities, third party 
contacts, gifts, use of confidential information, handling of conflicts of interest in legislative 
decision-making4 (see Djankov 2010; Nikolov 2013; Mattarella 2014). The distinction 
between preventive and disclosure mechanisms allows us to identify five rule configurations 
with regard to each of the areas that range from the absence of constraints to complete 
prohibition, which we assign scores from “zero” to “four” respectively (see Table 1). This 
coding approach assures an unbiased categorization of the legal mechanisms used across 
COI regimes in terms of constraints they impose on MPs and avoids counting requirements 
to disclose information as equally constraining as rules that prohibit or restrict actual 
behavior. The scores for each of the 11 substantive areas of COI regulation are 
standardized from 0 to 1 and averaged to an overall country score capturing the COI 
regime’s rule strictness. 5 
Table 1: Combinations of Legal Mechanisms and Rule Strictness Scores6 
Prevention on COI No rules No rules Restrictions Restrictions Total ban 
Disclosure of COI No rules Disclosure No rules Disclosure - 
Overall COI  
strictness score 
0 1 2 3 4 
Note: The darker the coloring, the higher the level of constraint in the combination of mechanisms.  
 
 
                                                          
4
 This contains two categories of regulation: those that obligate MPs to declare regarding individual decisions 
that they are affected by a conflict of interest or provisions that require MPs to excuse themselves. 
5
 Figure A1 in Online Appendix A shows the distribution of the rule strictness scores reflecting the 
combinations of legal mechanisms country by country. 
6
 See Online Appendix B which illustrates this logic with reference to the example of the regulation of gifts.  
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To capture the constraints inherent in the enforcement structures we assess whether we find 
monitoring bodies or units to underpin preventive rules and disclosure rules respectively. If 
present, we assess the nature of these bodies (or body – some countries use the same body 
for both types of COI rules, others use separate ones) using two criteria, reflecting our 
theoretical discussion of properties that make it more likely that such a body actively fulfills 
its monitoring function in terms of motivation and capacity. Regarding the motivation to 
monitor, we consider whether enforcement bodies are independent from parliament and not 
affiliated with any political party (Nassmacher 2003: 13; Clark 2015: 2).7 For instance, in 
France we find an independent body responsible for implementing disclosing rules: the 
Supreme Authority for the Transparency of Public Life8, while preventive mechanisms are 
monitored by the National Assembly´s Commissioner for Ethical Standards, which is a part 
of the French parliament, thus, does not qualify as independent. Finland lacks any specific 
monitoring structures to implement disclosure rules, but speaker and committee chairs in 
parliament are responsible for monitoring compliance with preventive mechanisms, which 
again does not qualify as independent. Additionally, we account for a body’s monitoring 
capacity which is considered as broad if the body can examine the correctness of 
information provided by parliamentarians in relation to their compliance with preventive or 
disclosing COI rules. If that is not the case we consider its monitoring capacity as narrow.9 
Countries are ranked from all-permissive regimes with no specific body for COI enforcement 
in place for either preventive or disclosing rules to most constraining enforcement regimes 
with independent watchdogs with broad monitoring capacity for both types of rules.10 The 
final scores are standardized from zero to one. 
                                                          
7
 See Figure B3 in Online Appendix B for an overview of the scores capturing enforcement in our sample. 
8
 The Supreme Authority for the Transparency of Public Life is coded as an independent body as it consists of 
six appointees from the high courts of the state (Conseil d’État, Court of Cassation and Court of Audit), two 
parliamentary appointees and one appointee of the President of the French Republic. 
9
 We assign a score “zero” on one end of the spectrum to the all-permissive regimes and a score “eight” to the 
most constraining ones. A regime without an enforcement structure for preventive COI rules but an 
independent watchdog with broad monitoring powers for disclosing rules takes an intermediate position with 
a score of “four”. 
10
 In comparison to the measurement of COI regime’s rule strictness, we capture the constraints inherent in 
COI enforcement structure overall (i.e. we do not weigh enforcement of preventive rules more heavily than 
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Both rule strictness and strength of enforcement contribute to the likelihood that formal COI 
rule violations are officially detected and notified, and hence belong together. Also 
empirically, the Spearman test confirms that the two measures highly and significantly 
correlate with each other (N=26, ρ= 0.73, p<.01). The coefficient is positive and very high, 
thus, the introduction of stricter COI rules is positively associated with the creation of 
stronger enforcement structures. Therefore, an index of COI Strictness should encompass 
both components. Figure 2 depicts a monotonic relationship, which underpins our 
conceptually driven decision to combine information on rule strictness and enforcement into 
one COI Strictness Index empirically.11  
 
Figure 2: Relationship between COI Rule Strictness and Enforcement 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
enforcement of disclosing rules) to assess whether any given rules are underpinning by enforcement 
structures and if so by which type. 
11
 It may seem that combining rule strictness and enforcement without weighing can lead to the unwanted 
weighting of the components constituting these two parameters (OECD 2008: 31). Yet we avoid this problem 
as we systematically transfer our ratings assigned to these components into the proportions of constraints in 
the regulation.  
See Figure B4 in Online Appendix for the distribution of the COI Strictness Index in the sample. 
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Figure 2 also points to interesting cross-national variation, most notably that COI strictness 
tends to be higher in old democracies than new ones. While we find a number of old 
democracies that have adopted constraining COI regimes (Ireland, Belgium and France), 
most old democracies show below-average scores such as the Scandinavian countries. 
While we will return to this when discussing COI regimes as a means to reestablish trust in 
parliaments (trust that is notably lower in new democracies), it is noteworthy that we find 
similar patterns in other areas unrelated to parliamentary ethics such as party finance 
regulation (Casal Bértoa et al 2014: 359; 374-75) or party-specific regulations in 
constitutions (Biezen 2012: 201). This enhances confidence in our measures but also 
echoes classical arguments associating democracies with national regulatory styles that 
cross-cut distinct areas of regulation (Epstein 1989; Jepperson and Meyer 1991). 
 
Following Casal Bértoa et al. (2014), we develop an ordinal scale for measuring the range of 
sanctions. This measure captures whether the violation of preventing and of disclosing rules 
in a given COI regime can be punished by criminal sanctions, by administrative sanctions or 
both. Criminal sanctions are treated as more constraining than non-criminal ones.12 Figure 3 
shows considerable cross-country variation. Of 16 democracies with a sanction score above 
0.5, only four are old democracies, with France and Belgium having maximum scores, 
echoing the earlier picture that new democracies have more constraining regulation. 
  
                                                          
12
 See further details on the rank assignment in Appendix C. 
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Figure 3: Sanction Scores Underpinning COI Regimes 
 
 
Our transparency index captures the possibility for third party control and differentiates 
between modes of access to information related to COI rule implementation. We use three 
criteria to assess conditions for third party access to information as related to the compliance 
with or violation of preventive and disclosure COI rules. We consider whether information is 
disclosed publically (whether no public access is possible, information is provided on 
request, or there is a free access via printed or online mass media); the scope (or 
completeness) of information that is made publicly available (whether the institutions that 
release information to the public present all or only part of the information they receive about 
the parliamentarian); and finally whether information about rule violations by MPs is released 
or not, a form of ‘shaming through transparency’.13 Figure 4 shows the variation in our 
                                                          
13
 A COI regime has a transparency rank of “eleven” if all the transparency options are coded as present, which 
indicates the maximum possible level of transparency with regard to both preventive and disclosure rules and 
a “zero” if none are present. Rank “five” is assigned to regimes that, for instance, have transparency 
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sample.14 Compared to the other two indices, transparency scores are more diverse, 
highlighting the importance to keep the three aspects separate. Indeed, old democracies 
being located at both ends of the spectrum: the UK and Bulgaria have adopted the most 
extensive, compulsory COI transparency measures with Denmark having no compulsory 
transparency measures at all. 
 
Figure 4: Transparency Requirements Underpinning COI Regimes 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
requirements in relation to both preventive and disclosing rules, yet in either case the scope of the 
information published is limited, while no information on rule violations is released. Note this is only one 
possible institutional constellation that might receive a rank “five”. 
14
 We construct an additive index of overall constraints implied by transparency requirements as linked to 
preventing and disclosing rules. We do not prioritize preventive rules over the disclosing rules in this case as 
there are no theoretical reasons or empirical indication that information release on non-compliance with one 
type of rule is perceived as more or less problematic by those regulated or by the public. Note that, as with the 
measure of rule strictness, the indicators are interdependent (e.g. if no public information release is required, 
the scope of such release is of no relevance). We consider the whole theoretically possible range of variation 
and also assure equal distances between the different levels of the index. 
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So how are our sanction and transparency indices related to each other or and to our 
strictness index? Again in line with our theoretical expectations both the COI Sanction Index 
and the Transparency Index correlate with our COI Strictness Index by far less strongly (ρ= 
0.54, p<.01 and ρ= 0.54, p<.01 respectively) than rule strictness and enforcement (see 
above). Our conceptual discussion has already pointed out that our three indices share 
some common variability.  This is confirmed empirically: as correlations show COI strictness 
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for adopting transparency requirements or 
sanctions. Simultaneously, the Spearman test between the COI Sanction Index and the COI 
Transparency Index is not significant indicating independence of these two indices from 
each other (ρ=0.21, p>.29). This stresses the different rationales underpinning countries’ 
adoption of sanctions and transparency requirements respectively and thus the need to treat 
COI Sanction Index and COI Transparency Index separately in empirical analyses. The 
empirical variability of combinations of different COI dimensions is illustrated by cases that 
prioritize individual dimensions such as in the case of the UK which has (with Bulgaria) the 
highest score on transparency but comparatively low scores on the two indices, particularly 
sanctions. Last but not least, the Cronbach´s α for the three indices put together constitutes 
only 0.64 signifying a lack of coherence between the indices when they are pulled together 
and treated equally, and thus supporting our theoretical expectations.  
 
Why to Distinguish Different Elements of COI Regimes? COI Regulation and Trust in 
National Parliaments – An Empirical Illustration 
Among policy-makers ethics regulation applied to parliamentarians is often discussed as a 
potential remedy against citizens’ growing alienation and distrust in parliamentary institutions 
(OECD 2005: 16-18; NDI 1999: 3-4). Figure 5 shows that the high mean trust levels in 
national parliament in a democracy15 is associated with a low COI Strictness Index 
                                                          
15
 See for details on the trust data the next section and Appendix D. Note Norway could not be included as the 
country was not covered in the Eurobarometer data used. 
17 
 
 
 
(Pearson´s r=-0.76, p<0.01, n=25).  Countries such as Denmark, Sweden, Finland, 
Luxembourg and Malta are particularly high on trust and low on COI Strictness, while 
Slovenia, Bulgaria and Lithuania show opposite patterns, with countries such as Germany, 
UK and Spain located in the middle. 
Figure 5: Trust in National Parliament and COI Strictness 
 
A number of scholars have been critical of the idea, wide-spread among practitioners, that 
stricter regulatory constraints could re-establish trust in those public officials no longer 
considered trustworthy. While we do not aim to test the nature of the relationship between 
COI regulation and trust as such, these arguments provide a theoretical rationale for 
engaging in an examination which aims at empirically demonstrating the usefulness of 
distinguishing different elements of the COI regime as proposed in our analytical framework. 
So what are the arguments in favour of a negative relationship between COI regulation and 
trust? For once, to make parliamentarians subject to a strict COI regime might convince 
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citizens that parliamentarians’ won’t get away with unethical behaviour as easily. Yet if 
“calling someone trustworthy means that the person can be trusted with a wide variety of 
unspecified activities” (van Aaken and Voigt 2011: 307, italics added to original), the 
presence of effective controls is different from making parliamentarians more trustworthy. 
Instead COI rule might ‘institutionalize distrust’ and make ‘blind trust’ less necessary as the 
law coerces MPs to behave ethically instead of relying on internalized norms of behaviour 
(van Aaken and Voigt 2011: 307), as “where we have guarantees or proofs, we don't need to 
trust. Trust is redundant” (O’Neil 2002a). 
 
This points to two possible side-effects of stricter COI regulation: first, expanding citizens’ 
information on parliamentarians’ unethical behaviour is more likely to decrease trust in 
parliamentarians or parliament as institution, and stricter COI regulation does just that 
(Wilcox 2001: 10; see also Rosenthal 2005: 175; Ginsberg and Shefter 1994: 7; 
Loewenstein et al 2011), a potential dynamic that is amply highlighted in debates on the 
consequences of transparency measures in public life generally (O’Neil 2002b). COI 
regulation - as ethics regimes generally - is preventive. It aims at creating norms through 
which ‘proper conduct can become second nature’ (NDI 1999: 3). Thus, strict COI regulation 
is likely to foster trust only once parliamentarians’ comply and no rule violations occur. If – at 
least initially - tougher regulation sheds light on more rule violations (intentional as well as 
unintentional ones) rather than preventing them, to have proof about wide-spread unethical 
behaviour might make matters worse than distrust predominantly fostered by rumours and 
suspicions or revelation about individual cases (van Aaken and Voigt 2011: 307). 
Consequently, intense monitoring can weaken or undermine trust (Olsen 2013: 454). 
Second, COI regulation itself might – unintentionally – raise citizens’ expectations about 
what behaviour is acceptable and what is not, as ethics rules ought to be increasingly 
detailed to minimize misunderstandings (NDI 1999: 6). Specifying the formerly rather blurred 
boundary between what is acceptable and what not, COI regulation itself can become a 
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catalyst enhancing public concerns about ethics (Rosenthal 2005: 175) and thereby raise the 
bar of what ethics regulation ought to achieve (Saint-Martin 2008: 48). 
 
Data and Operationalization of Variables 
To explore the relationship between our COI indices and trust, we make use of 
Eurobarometer 81.4 (2014) which measures trust in national parliaments, covering 25 of 26 
countries in our sample.16 Trust is measured with the question whether a respondent tends 
to trust (1) or tends not to trust (0) national parliament. In all countries the survey was 
conducted after all elements of the COI regime captured by our indices were already in 
place. We include a range of individual control variables, in line with earlier studies on trust 
in national parliaments and public institutions more generally (e.g. Catterberg and Moreno 
2005: 42; van der Meer 2010; van Aaken and Voigt 2011: 312-13; Zwerli and Newton 2011; 
Torcal 2014). Zwerli and Newton (2011: 73) argue that citizens trust political institutions 
more if they consider themselves as winners, socially or politically. We therefore control for 
individuals’ perceived self-placement in society capturing their perceived status in society 
(and the political regime broadly conceived). The same goes for life satisfaction and for older 
and married respondents. In contrast, personal economic stability and perceived personal 
security should show a negative relationship. The former is measured as difficulties in paying 
bills ranging from frequent to seldom, the latter by expectations regarding one’s personal 
employment situation, and as feeling safe in one’s neighborhood. Psychological approaches, 
in turn, stress the role of personal interests – in our case in politics (Catterberg and Moreno 
2005: 42). As our dependent variable is linked to the national level (individual trust in 
national parliament), we use an item capturing the self-perceived frequency of discussions 
regarding national political matters (ranging from low to high). Importantly, we control for 
trust in political parties which can be expected to ‘colour’ perceptions of trust in national 
political institutions composed of party politicians and control for the years of democratic 
                                                          
16
 We lost Norway because Eurobarometer (EB) does not include information on it.  
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development. The longer a democracy is established the more likely citizens have 
experienced changes in political leadership and been on the ‘winning side’. Furthermore, 
experiencing government alternation, citizens can be expected to gain trust in central 
democratic institutions such as parliament. Both rationales suggest a positive correlation. 
Finally, we coded a new macro variable ‘political instability’ which we expect to affect trust in 
parliament negatively. This dummy variable captures whether a country suffered from a 
destabilizing political event in the legislative term in which trust in parliament (our dependent 
variable) was measured or in the term prior or not (For more details on data and 
measurements see the Online Appendix D).  
 
Model Choice and Empirical Findings 
The analysis of the interclass correlation suggests we observe approximately a quarter of 
the variance in our dependent variable on the macro level as compared to the micro level 
(ICC = 0.24). We therefore fit a set of multilevel logistic regression models with a 
random intercept, as the Eurobarometer data measures trust to parliament in a binary 
fashion. Table 2 presents our results.17 Model 1 contains only control variables. Model 2 
tests all the three indices against each other. Model 3 and 4 demonstrate effects of macro-
level controls in relation to our COI Strictness Index (the only index significant in Model 2).18 
Model 5 shows the effect of the COI Strictness Index separately.    
 
Table 2 shows that our COI Strictness Index shows robust and significant effects (Models 2-
5)19. Hence, the more constraints the COI regime imposes in terms of rule strictness and 
enforcement (covering both preventive and disclosing rules), the lower the log-odds, and 
hence the lower the probability that citizens tend to trust national parliament, holding all other 
                                                          
17
 Note that tests for multicollinearity of the presented models do not reveal any problems.  
18
 We are aware that 25 countries can be a critical sample size for a multi-level design. Note that the results of 
logistic regression with clustered standard errors are the same. 
19
Appendix D provides details on additional robustness checks and tests regarding endogeneity and reverse 
causation. 
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parameters constant. Our COI Transparency Index has a negative association to trust. The 
COI Sanction Index correlates with trust positively. While neither of the latter two indices 
shows robust significant results (see Model 2), the COI Transparency Index outperforms the 
COI Sanction Index when treated alone.20 Thus, COI Sanctions have the least impact when 
comparing the three COI dimensions (t=0.06).  
 
These findings hold despite our control variables having the theoretically expected significant 
effects. The measure of years of democracy is positively associated with trust in national 
parliament but only significant as long as we don’t include our COI Strictness Index (Model 
4). This might reflect a tendency in new democracies to impose stricter and more extensive 
COI regimes in comparison to the old democracies (Figure 2), which is in line with previous 
findings (Biezen and Kopecký 2008; Biezen 2012; Casal Bértoa et al. 2014).  A higher self-
placement in society, overall life satisfaction, better employment expectations, higher 
personal economic stability, a safe neighborhood, and marriage status taken as indicators 
associated with the “winner status” of citizens are positively associated with a probability to 
trust in national parliament (Dunn 2012; Zmerli and Newton 2011). High levels of political 
knowledge also significantly increase the log-odds of tending to trust national parliament. A 
very important predictor of trust in parliament is trust in political parties as adding this control 
significantly improves the fit of the model (BIC falls by more than 20 percent). That said, 
having this variable excluded does not affect the performance of our indices (see Appendix 
D, Table D1). Finally, our findings hold when entering our political instability dummy (Model 
3), despite the latter – as theoretically expected - showing a significant and robust negative 
effect on tendencies to trust in parliament. 
 
  
                                                          
20
 Appendix D Table D2 provides results for additional specifications.  
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Table 2: Results of Multilevel Logistic Regressions with Random Intercept on Trust in 
National Parliaments 
DV: Trust in parliament (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Controls      
Age 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Family status: married 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Life satisfaction 0.485*** 0.488*** 0.487*** 0.487*** 0.487*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
Political knowledge 1.168*** 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.167*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Personal economic stability 0.166*** 
(0.037) 
0.166*** 
(0.037) 
0.164*** 
(0.037) 
0.166*** 
(0.037) 
0.166*** 
(0.037) 
Employment expectations 0.505*** 
(0.029) 
0.505*** 
(0.029) 
0.505*** 
(0.029) 
0.505*** 
(0.029) 
0.505*** 
(0.029) 
Safe neighborhood 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Self-placement in the society 0.166*** 
(0.033) 
0.165*** 
(0.033) 
0.166*** 
(0.033) 
0.165*** 
(0.033) 
0.165*** 
(0.033) 
Trust in parties 2.942*** 2.942*** 2.942*** 2.942*** 2.942*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Years of democracy 0.020***   0.006  
 (0.006)   (0.008)  
Political instability -0.728**  -0.495*   
 (0.251)  (0.242)   
IVs      
COI Strictness Index  -2.341*** -2.111*** -1.967***** -2.329*** 
  (0.699) (0.501) (0.697) (0.529) 
COI Sanction Index   0.309    
  (0.516)    
COI Transparency Index  -0.424 
(0.597) 
   
BIC 16746.2 16756.0 16743.3 16746.5 16737.2 
Chi2 3989.0 3989.4 3987.7 3987.7 3987.7 
Log Likelihood -8308.4 -8308.4 -8308.9 -8308.9 -8308.9 
Individual observations 20940 20940 20940 20940 20940 
Countries 25 25 25 25 25 
 
Log-odds; constants are not shown; standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.001 
 
Most importantly, we find a robust negative association regarding our COI Strictness index 
but not our other two indices, rather than finding similar relationships between trust and all 
three. This demonstrates the usefulness of our conceptual distinction between different 
types of COI constraints underpinning the separation of the indices. This is further 
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substantiated as the nature of the constraints that our Strictness Index (composed of rule 
strictness and enforcement) reflects the theoretical mechanisms highlighted in the literature 
as rationalizing an expectation of a negative relationship between COI constraints and trust 
in the first place (see above): first, the tendency of tougher regulation to initially reveal more 
rule violations rather than preventing them, producing systematic evidence confirming 
citizens’ suspicions about parliamentarians’ unethical behaviour (e.g. Wilcox 2001; 
Rosenthal 2005); second, specifying the formerly blurred boundary between what is 
acceptable and what not or by problematizing behaviour that otherwise would have been 
accepted without question (e.g. Saint-Martin 2008).  
 
Returning to our conceptualizations of our three elements of COI regimes, the COI 
Strictness Index captures clear-cut and constraining ethics rules which make formal rule 
violations more likely and thus might unintentionally raise citizens’ expectations towards 
parliamentarians’ behaviour. Similarly, strong enforcement structures as the second index 
component systematically increase chances of official detection. In contrast, transparency 
requirements might – when media attention is high – lead to occasional public outcries but 
third party control is not equivalent to a specialized enforcement structure engaged in on-
going systematic monitoring of rule compliance. This finding echoes theoretical works on 
transparency measures and their implications for public accountability as well as trust that 
are sceptical about these measures’ effectiveness (Olsen 2013; O’Neil 2002). Furthermore, 
the detection of violations is likely to have more weight if confirmed as ‘official misconduct’ 
by a public authority (Allen 2011). Similarly, the relative severity and range of sanctions is 
unlikely to be as relevant to citizens, as compared to the official notification that MPs violate 
binding rules, as captured by our COI Strictness Index. These parallels between conceptual 
distinctions and the nature of our empirical findings stress the fruitfulness of conceptualizing 
and measuring different elements of COI regimes when engaging in cross-national analyses. 
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Conclusion and Future Research 
Over the last decade, the diversity of conflict of interest (COI) regulation applicable to 
national parliamentarians (as well as other public officials) has grown significantly in many 
democracies. Defined as the range of formal-legal restrictions to assure parliamentarians’ 
impartial or unbiased decision-making when exercising their representative function (Nikolov 
2013: 407), COI regulation embraces a wide range of diverse mechanisms which we capture 
across 11 substantive areas. These not only include (increasingly prominent) requirements 
for asset disclosure but also preventive rules able to impose constraints on parliamentarians’ 
behaviour, both while being in office (e.g. restrictions on the receipts of gifts) and afterwards 
(e.g. cooling off requirements). This growing diversity creates a major challenge for cross-
national research: the development of measures capturing the different elements of 
increasingly complex ethics regimes in an unbiased fashion, able to ‘travel’ across European 
democracies.  
 
To tackle this challenge, this paper distinguished three conceptual dimensions of COI 
regimes applied to national parliamentarians as public representatives and developed 
measures to capture them empirically: COI strictness, sanctions and transparency. Based on 
a new dataset we showed that these indeed constitute empirically separate dimensions 
across the 26 democracies studied. To illustrate the usefulness of our analytical distinctions 
we then examined the relationship between the three COI indices and trust in national 
parliaments. Controlling for a range of individual-level and systemic factors theorized as 
relevant for trust in public institutions, our COI Strictness Index (combining rule strictness 
and enforcement structures) shows a significant and robust negative relationship with trust, 
while our COI Sanction and Transparency Indices do not, stressing the particular importance 
of COI Strictness, which mirrors theoretical arguments pointing to this element’s centrality. 
This  analysis on the relationship between COI regulation and trust highlights the fruitfulness 
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of distinguishing these particular elements of parliamentary COI regimes in separate 
measures as compared to quantifying the intensity of regulation overall, a common strategy 
employed in  analyses of the regulation of political parties (e.g. Whitley 2011; 2014; but see 
Biezen 2012; Casal et al 2014). To pin down causal relationships between regulation and 
trust (or alternative attitudinal or behavioural variables), future research needs to assess the 
over-time evolution of ethics regimes across a wider range of democracies as a subset of 
parliamentary rules, whose comparative, longitudinal study has made significant advances in 
recent years (Sieberer et al 2011; 2016).  
 
Importantly, while our framework captures the central components of ethics regimes 
regulating parliamentarians as representatives, it provides a sound foundation to engage in 
comparative analyses of regulation of their behaviour as party politicians and self-interested 
individuals as well. For instance, our conceptual distinctions can be used as a template to 
develop measures to study party finance regulation. While drawing on the party finance 
literature (e.g. Nassmacher 2003) to develop our framework, only few large-N studies have 
measured qualitatively different elements of party finance regimes separately (e.g. Casal et 
al 2014). Similarly, comparative studies of regulation trying to prevent the partisan use of 
institutional resources by MPs or of the enforcement of funding regulations more generally 
have received little attention so far (Bolleyer and Gauja 2015: 322; Clark 2015: 2). Finally, a 
narrower yet highly sensitive area of regulation is the one of MP expenses aiming at 
preventing parliamentarians to exploit institutional resources for their own financial gain 
(Allen and Birch 2015). While none of these areas of regulation targets MP legislative 
decision-making as COI regulation does, they often are equally contentious as also here 
those subject to the rules are usually involved in their making.  
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